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 Non-technical Summary 
Uncertainty is intrinsic to research and development (R&D) and has a fundamental 
influence on the decision to invest in such activities.  Real options theoretical models with 
irreversible investment are a natural starting point for understanding how uncertainty 
influences R&D investment.  When returns are uncertain and firms have the opportunity to 
delay investment, these models predict higher levels of uncertainty will be associated with 
lower levels of current R&D investment.  Other theoretical work, however, suggests this 
“option to delay” investment may not be valuable when firms face competitive pressure or 
when R&D investments create valuable growth opportunities.  These mediating factors 
suggest the direction of the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is ambiguous.   
 This paper contributes to the literature by looking at how competition and firm size 
affect the R&D investment-uncertainty relationship.  We use an intuitively appealing measure 
of firm-level uncertainty along with panel data to show that firms invest less in current R&D 
as uncertainty about market returns increases.  The effect of firm-specific uncertainty on 
R&D investment is smaller in concentrated markets – those where market power is higher 
and strategic rivalry is more intense.  This is consistent with those theoretical models 
suggesting that growth options and the benefits of pre-emption offset the dampening effect of 
uncertainty.  Further, the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is attenuated for large 
firms.  This is consistent with models highlighting that uncertainty increases incentives for 
current investment when there are growth options.  Large firms may have greater economies 
of scope relative to small firms.  This permits both R&D knowledge and inputs to be 
transferred to alternative uses within the firm and can be interpreted as a form of capacity 
building highlighted in the growth options literature.   
 Zusammenfassung (Summary in German) 
Unsicherheit ist ein immanenter Faktor von Forschungs- und Entwicklung (FuE) und hat 
einen grundlegenden Einfluss auf Investitionsentscheidungen. Die Literatur zu „Real 
Options“ Modellen bildet eine Basis für empirische Analysen von 
Investitionsentscheidungen, insbesondere wenn es sich um größtenteils irreversible Ausgaben 
wie FuE-Aktivitäten handelt. Wenn Profite solcher Investitionsprojekte ungewiss sind und 
Unternehmen diese Investition verzögern können, zeigen ökonomische Theorien, dass bei 
höherer Unsicherheit weniger investiert wird. Jedoch gibt es auch Modelle, die beschreiben, 
dass die Option die Investition zu verzögern, nicht profitabel sein muss, wenn Unternehmen 
einem hohen Konkurrenzdruck ausgesetzt sind, oder wenn diese FuE-Aktivitäten 
hinreichende Wachstumsmöglichkeiten versprechen. Durch solche gegensätzlichen Anreize 
ist der Effekt von Unsicherheit auf das Investitionsverhalten nicht eindeutig. 
In dieser Studie analysieren wir empirisch, wie Wettbewerb und Unternehmensgröße einen 
möglichen negativen Zusammenhang zwischen Investitionen und Unsicherheit beeinflussen. 
Mit Hilfe von Paneldaten können wir zeigen, dass Unternehmen bei höherer Unsicherheit 
über die erwarteten Profite tatsächlich weniger investieren. Jedoch ist der Effekt der 
firmenspezifischen Unsicherheit kleiner in konzentrierten Märkten sowie in 
Großunternehmen. Wir führen dies auf zwei Gründe zurück. In konzentrierten Märkten kann 
die strategische Interaktion zwischen Unternehmen intensiver sein als in anderen Märkten. 
Durch Innovationsaktivitäten kann ein Konkurrenzkampf in Produktmärkten 
vorweggenommen werden, sodass der negative Effekt von Unsicherheit reduziert wird. 
Ferner können Großunternehmen Erkenntnisse aus FuE-Aktivitäten besser in alternative 
Verwendungen transferieren als kleine Unternehmen („economies of scope“), was auch zur 
Reduktion der negativen Investitionsanreize unter Unsicherheit führt.  
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1 Introduction 
Uncertainty is intrinsic to research and development (R&D) and has a fundamental 
influence on the decision to invest in such activities.  Real options theoretical models with 
irreversible investment are a natural starting point for understanding how uncertainty 
influences R&D investment.  When returns are uncertain and firms have the opportunity to 
delay investment, these models predict higher levels of uncertainty will be associated with 
lower levels of current R&D investment (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Caballero and Pindyck 
1996; Novy-Marx 2007; and others).2  Other theoretical work, however, suggests this “option 
to delay” investment may not be valuable when firms face competitive pressure or when 
R&D investments create valuable growth opportunities (Caballero 1991; Grenadier 2002; 
Weeds 2002; Kulatilaka and Perotti 1998; and others).  These mediating factors suggest the 
direction of the effect of uncertainty on R&D investment is ambiguous.   
 There is a surprising paucity of evidence in the empirical literature on how 
uncertainty influences R&D investment and we found no published studies looking at the 
mediating roles played by competition and growth opportunities.3  In some recent work, 
                                                 
2 The theoretical literature we cite in this paper uses general models of investment that are not typically 
specialized to a particular type of capital investment such as R&D.   
3 There is a growing empirical literature on the relationship between fixed capital investment and uncertainty at 
the firm-level.  Recent contributions include Baum et al. (2007), Bloom et al. (2007), Bulan (2005).  Butzen and 
Fuss (2002) and Carruth et al. (2000) review the prior literature.  Using industry data, Ghosal and Loungani 
(1996) find that physical capital investment falls in response to price uncertainty in competitive industries, but 
has no significant response in industries with high seller concentration.  In another analysis, Ghosal and 
Loungani (2000) find that investment is more responsive to uncertainty in industries dominated by small firms.  
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Czarnitzki and Toole (2007) find that higher uncertainty, measured as the volatility in a 
firm’s share of new product sales, reduces R&D investment.  Analyzing a sample of OECD 
countries, Goel and Ram (2001) find that greater uncertainty, measured as the standard 
deviation in a country’s inflation rate, reduces the share of R&D in GDP but has no 
significant effect on the share of non-R&D investment in GDP.  Minton and Schrand (1999) 
find that cash flow volatility is associated with lower R&D investment using a sample of 
public firms in the US.   
 This paper contributes to the literature by looking at how competition and firm size 
affect the R&D investment-uncertainty relationship.  We use an intuitively appealing measure 
of firm-level uncertainty along with panel data to show that firms invest less in current R&D 
as uncertainty about market returns increases.  The effect of firm-specific uncertainty on 
R&D investment is smaller in concentrated markets – those where market power is higher 
and strategic rivalry is more intense.  This is consistent with those theoretical models 
suggesting that growth options and the benefits of pre-emption offset the dampening effect of 
uncertainty, but not with the theoretical results of Caballero (1991).  Further, the effect of 
uncertainty on R&D investment is attenuated for large firms.  This is consistent with models 
highlighting that uncertainty increases incentives for current investment when there are 
growth options.  Large firms may have greater economies of scope relative to small firms.4  
This permits both R&D knowledge and inputs to be transferred to alternative uses within the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Using firm-level survey data, Guiso and Parigi (1999) find that firms with low market power (more competitive 
industries) are less responsive to uncertainty than firms with more market power.  
4 For large pharmaceutical firms, Henderson and Cockburn (1996) find economies of scope to be a significant 
advantage for research productivity.  
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firm and can be interpreted as a form of capacity building highlighted in the growth options 
literature.   
2 Data and Empirical Model 
2.1 Data 
We construct an unbalanced panel database consisting of 881 “innovative” firms from 
Germany’s manufacturing sector observed between 1995 and 2001.5  An innovative firm is 
defined as a company that introduced at least one new product in the pre-sample period, that 
is, before the firm enters the panel database.  To determine the firm-year observations in our 
database, we require the firm to be observed at least three times before the corresponding 
year t.  We use these pre-sample years to generate some of the explanatory variables 
including our proxy for the firm’s perceived uncertainty in the market for innovations.  Our 
final database has 2,974 firm-year observations which are structured as follows:  21% of 
firms are observed twice, 23% three times, 21% four times, and the remaining 36% are 
observed between 5 and 7 times.   
The log-level of current R&D investment for firm i at time t, (lnR&Dit), is our 
dependent variable.6  Consistent with what one would expect from real options behavior, one-
                                                 
5 Our data come from the Mannheim Innovation Panel which is an annual survey conducted by the Center for 
European Economic Research (ZEW).  The panel is unbalanced because firms do not respond to the survey in 
every year.  The first survey year was 1992.  
6 The distribution of R&D investment is skewed above zero and this motivates our use of the logarithmic 
specification.  Since we cannot take the log of the censored observations at R&Di = 0, we set those observations 
to the minimum observed positive value of R&D in the sample and interpret this observed minimum as the 
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third of the innovative firms with positive R&D in the past have at least one observation with 
zero R&D investment in subsequent years.  Since our sample has a number of smaller private 
firms (the median number of employees per firm is 110), R&D investment is intermittent.7  In 
regression models, we account for the censored distribution of R&D using a Tobit model.   
We assume firms use their past market experience as innovators to form their 
expectations about future market uncertainty.  Market uncertainty is measured by the 
coefficient of variation of past sales. We distinguish two components of past sales since our 
data allow us to explicitly account for sales of new products introduced in the most recent 
three years and sales of established products.  Hence, we calculate UNC_NEW, the 
coefficient of variation of new product sales, and UNC_OLD, the coefficient of variation of 
older, more established product sales.  To eliminate firm size effects in sales volume, we 
rescale the sales revenues by the number of firm employees. The number of observations 
available for calculating the coefficients of variation depend on year of entry into the panel 
and the number of observations varies from three to nine years depending on data availability 
(s = 1,…,S, with S ranging between 3 and 9): 8 
                                                                                                                                                        
censoring point in the regression models.  R&D is measured in millions of Deutsche Marks DM (1.95583 DM = 
1 EURO). 
7 This is consistent with real option behavior because the trigger values for investing and abandoning projects 
are higher and lower, respectively, than those predicted from standard net present value analysis.  See Novy-
Marx (2007) for a discussion of the implications from intermittent and lumpy investment behavior in a real 
options theoretical model. 
8 For the regression models presented below, we performed robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our 
results to the length of the pre-sample period used.  This did not materially affect our results.  If desired, these 
results can be obtained from the authors. 
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where R refers to sales with new products or sales with old products, respectively, and L 
denotes employment.  
Since we are interested in how competition and firm size affect the R&D investment-
uncertainty relationship, we create interaction variables between uncertainty and our 
measures of industry competition and firm size.  The competitiveness of an industry is 
measured using the seller concentration given by the Herfindahl index based on shares of 
total market sales at the 3-digit NACE level, ln(HHI).9  We define industries in the upper 
quintile of the distribution of the Herfindahl index as highly concentrated indicating a high 
degree of market power and strategic rivalry.  Firm size is measured using the number of 
employees in the firm.  We define a firm as large when it has more than 500 employees.  In 
our sample, 18% of the firms are large.  We checked the cut points for concentration and firm 
size for robustness and this is discussed in the results section below. 
Papers by Caballero and Pindyck (1996) and Leahy and Whited (1996) highlight that 
greater industry-level and systematic (economy-wide) uncertainties are associated with lower 
current investment.  To control for these sources of uncertainty, we calculate an industry-
level measure of uncertainty and use a full set of industry and time dummy variables in the 
models.  We calculate the coefficient of variation of total industry sales over time at the 3-
                                                 
9 NACE is the European standard industry classification.  
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digit NACE level obtained from German industry statistics (UNC_IND it-1).10  We also 
construct a proxy for firm-specific risk preferences using the firm’s recent product innovation 
strategy.  That is, firms with an aggressive product innovation strategy should be the least 
risk-averse firms, while those following a conservative innovation strategy should be the 
most risk-averse.  The firm’s relative innovativeness (PASTINNO) is calculated using its 
average share of new product sales relative to its industry in the pre-sample period (the same 
period over which we calculate our uncertainty measure). 
We use the firm’s patent stock, PSTOCKit-1, to control for existing R&D capabilities.  
It is calculated with data from the German Patent and Trademark Office.  Those data cover 
German patents (including EPO priority applications with German coverage) since 1978.  We 
cumulate each firm’s patents from 1978 forward using a 15% annual obsolescence rate of 
knowledge (see e.g. Griliches and Mairesse, 1984, or Hall, 1990, for details).  This control 
variable enters our models in lagged form to avoid simultaneity.  
Our specifications control for access to internal and external financial capital.  For the 
availability of internal capital, we use a measure of the firm’s average price-cost margin, 
(PASTPCM), in the pre-sample period:11  
                                                 
10 As we do not have information about employment at this detailed industry level, we do not normalize industry 
sales by the number of employees, but rather, the number of firms active in that industry in a given year. 
11  See Collins and Preston (1969), or Ravenscraft (1983). Scholars who have used such measures to test for 
financial constraints typically add back R&D to PCM, as R&D is an expense and reduces profits in the period. If 
the firm would have decided not to invested in R&D, PCM would have been accordingly higher and is therefore 
corrected by current R&D in most empirical studies (see e.g. Harhoff, 1998). 
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with PCM = (Sales – staff cost – material cost + R&D) / Sales, 
As a proxy for access to external credit, we use the firm’s credit rating from Creditreform, the 
largest German credit rating agency.  We use the rating in period t-1 in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems.12  The rating is an index ranging from 100 to 600, where 600 hundred 
is the worst and basically corresponds to bankruptcy. 
Finally, we include a location dummy, EASTi, indicating that the firm is based in 
Eastern Germany. These firms may show different investment behavior, on average, due to 
the German re-unification in 1990.  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables 
used.  Note that all time-variant variables enter the right-hand side of the regressions as 
lagged values, so that they can be treated as predetermined. 
 
>>>   Insert Table 1 about here   <<< 
 
2.2 Empirical Model 
We use two different estimators for our panel data, a pooled cross-sectional and a 
random effects panel estimator. The model can be written as 
(3)  
( )
( )2
max 0, , 1, 2, , , 1, 2, ,
| , 0,
it it i it
it i i u
y x c u i N t T
u x c N
β
σ
= + + = =… …
∼  
                                                 
12 For some firms, there was no rating available for the preceding year. In such cases we use ratings from one or 
two years earlier.  
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where yit is the dependent variable, xit denotes the set of regressors, β the parameters to be 
estimated, and ci the unobserved firm-specific effect, and uit is the error term. First, we 
assume that ci = 0, and thus the model can be estimated as a pooled cross-sectional model 
where we adjust the standard errors for firm clusters to account for the panel structure of the 
data. The pooled model has the advantage that it does not maintain the strict exogeneity 
assumption. While uit has to be independent of xit, the relationship between uit and xis, t ≠ s, is 
not specified (see Wooldridge, 2002: 538).  For instance, the model allows for feedback of 
R&D in period t to the regressors in future periods.  In the second version of the model, we 
apply a random-effects Tobit panel estimator assuming ci ≠ 0. This requires the strict 
exogeneity assumption so the error term needs to be uncorrelated with the covariates across 
all time periods. In addition, the random-effects Tobit requires the assumption that ci is 
uncorrelated with xit.  Due to these stronger assumptions, we do not necessarily consider the 
random effect estimator as superior to the pooled cross-sectional estimator. Rather we think 
of it as a robustness check allowing for unobserved firm-specific effects at the cost of more 
restrictive assumptions otherwise. Note that we keep the time-invariant regressors (EAST and 
industry dummies) in the random-effects panel model in order to reduce the error variance of 
the firm-specific effect. 
3 Results 
Table 2 presents our regression results. We consider three versions of the empirical 
specification: model A is the baseline specification and excludes the interaction variables 
between market uncertainty, competition, and firm size.  Model B examines how the R&D 
investment-uncertainty relationship is mediated by competition.  Model C looks at how the 
R&D investment-uncertainty relationship differs between large and small firms.  In models B 
and C we estimate separate slope coefficients of uncertainty for each group of interest.  In 
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model B, the groups are concentrated versus less concentrated industries.  In model C, the 
groups are large versus small firms. 
Model A finds that uncertainty in the market for new products significantly reduces 
firm-level R&D investment.  This is consistent with prior studies even though those studies 
use different uncertainty proxies and databases (Minton and Schrand 1999; Czarnitzki and 
Toole 2007).  Uncertainty in the market for established products has no significant 
relationship with current R&D investment in any of the regression models in Table 2.  This 
stands to reason since R&D investment is directed predominantly toward innovation rather 
than cannibalization of established product sales.  Given the insignificance of uncertainty 
related to established product, the rest of the paper uses the term “uncertainty” to refer to 
uncertainty in market for new products. 
Among the control variables, industry-level uncertainty is not significant in either the 
pooled or random-effects regressions.  This is similar to prior work on physical capital 
investment by Leahy and Whited (1996) who looked at the CAPM relationship and Bulan 
(2005) who considers irreversible investment (neither of these studies examine R&D).  Our 
proxy for firm risk preferences (PASTINNO) has the correct sign, but is only marginally 
significant in the random effects models A and B.  The Herfindahl index is not significant in 
either model.  For the financing variables, internal funds are positive and significant in the 
pooled model, but because there is not a lot of variation over time, it is insignificant in the 
random effects panel model.  Access to external capital is not significant in either model.  
Patent stock, employment, and the Eastern Germany dummy variable are significant in both 
pooled and random effects models. Because the results for the control variables are very 
similar across models, we will not discuss these variables further. 
Model B looks at how competition influences the firm-level R&D investment-
uncertainty relationship.  When the distribution of Herfindahl index is partitioned at the 
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eightieth percentile, both models show that firms in upper quintile respond less to 
uncertainty.  The Chi-squared test reported at the bottom of Table 2 shows a statistically 
significant difference across the two groups.  We believe that these highly concentrated 
industries involve more intense strategic interaction and rivalry.  This finding is consistent 
with the predictions from some theoretical models that illustrate how strategic interactions 
erode the option value of waiting (Grenadier 2002; Weeds 2002; Kulatilaka and Perotti 
1998).13  It contradicts the findings of Guiso and Parigi (1999), but they examine physical 
capital investment.  If other cutoff points in the distribution of concentration are chosen, the 
firm-level responses to uncertainty become more similar. We re-estimated the model using 
the 70%, 60% and 50% quantiles of HHI as cutoff points. The difference in the estimated 
slopes coefficients decreases as the cutoff point is moved downwards in the distribution. 
While the estimated coefficient for more concentrated markets is still slightly larger than the 
one for less concentrated markets when the sample is split at the median of HHI, there is no 
statistically significant difference among them anymore. Both estimated coefficients 
approach the value of the non-interacted slope in model A. 
Model C examines how firm size influences the firm-level R&D investment-
uncertainty relationship.  Large firms respond less to market uncertainty than small firms.  
The Chi-squared test shows a statistically significant difference across the two groups.  These 
results are not driven by financial constraints since we control for internal and external access 
                                                 
13 Note that strategic interaction as we have measured it does not completely erode the option value of waiting 
as Grenadier’s model predicts.  Since the option value of waiting is still relatively large for low concentration 
markets (i.e. those closer to perfectly competitive markets), our evidence appears to be more consistent with the 
model presented by Novy-Marx (2007).  However, our empirical analysis is not a formal test of the differences 
between these models.  
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to financial capital.  If large firms maintain a more diverse portfolio of research projects that 
allow R&D personnel and equipment to be used in more than one application at no additional 
cost, then these “economies of scope” can offset the influence of uncertainty by providing 
growth options.    
 
>>>   Insert Table 2 about here   <<< 
 
We also calculated marginal effects for both models, that is, dE(Y|X)/dx. The estimated 
marginal effects at the mean of uncertainty amount to -1.61 and -2.73 for large versus small 
firms (significantly different at 1% level), and -1.93 and -2.71 for highly concentrated 
industries vs. others (different at 5% level). As these numbers are somewhat difficult to 
interpret economically, we illustrate the impact of uncertainty on R&D over the range of the 
uncertainty distribution in Figure 1.  It can be seen that the slope of the curve (the marginal 
effect) is more negative for smaller firms and for firms in highly concentrated industries 
compared to their respective control groups over a large range of the distribution.  
 
>>>   Insert Figure 1 about here   <<< 
 
4 Conclusions 
 This paper has empirically examined how competition and firm size affect the R&D 
investment-uncertainty relationship.  Our evidence suggests that strategic rivalry tends to 
erode the option value for waiting to invest in R&D, but not completely.  We also find that 
12 
large firms react less to market uncertainty which is consistent with the idea that large firms 
enjoy greater diversification and economies of scope in R&D activities.   
 There are a number of issues that remain for future research.  First, our measure of 
uncertainty is intuitively appealing but is based on prior firm experience.  To be completely 
consistent with theory, one needs an explicitly forward-looking measure.  Second, while our 
firm-level panel data make a significant step forward in the analysis of firm-specific 
uncertainty, the time series dimension of our data is not rich enough to model the dynamics 
of the R&D investment-uncertainty relationship.  Third, new empirical measures that capture 
economies of scope at the firm-level would allow researchers to analyze the mechanisms 
driving down real options values for large firms in greater detail.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (2974 firm-year observations) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R&Dit 9.514 96.347 0 3000
UNC_NEWi,t-1 0.942 0.695 0.009 3
UNC_OLDi,t-1 0.510 0.371 0.011 2.449
UNC_INDi,t-1 0.118 0.105 0.009 1.067
PASTINNOi,t-1 1.412 1.041 0.006 6.934
PASTPCMi,t-1 0.275 0.139 -0.373 0.827
EMPi,t-1 509.322 2493.741 1 45000
PSTOCKi,t-1/EMP i,t-1 0.018 0.044 0 0.370
HHIi,t-1 48.379 71.485 3.213 1000
RATINGi,t-1 215.507 66.301 100 600
EASTi 0.375 0.484 0 1
Large [D(EMPi,t-1>500)] 0.145 0.352 0 1
Note: 10 industry dummies and 6 time dummies not shown. 
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Table 2: Tobit regressions on ln(R&Dit), 1995-2001, 2974 firm-year observations 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Variable Pooled Tobita) RE Panel Tobit Pooled Tobita) RE Panel Tobit Pooled Tobita) RE Panel Tobit 
UNC_NEWi,t-1 -4.369*** -3.386***     
 (0.301) (0.274)     
UNC_NEWi,t-1 * D(HHI i,t-1 > Q80)   -3.254*** -2.524***   
   (0.518) (0.427)   
UNC_NEWi,t-1 *  D(HHI i,t-1 ≤ Q80)   -4.570*** -3.538***   
   (0.299) (0.282)   
UNC_NEWi,t-1 * LARGE FIRM     -2.717*** -1.662*** 
     (0.610) (0.493) 
UNC_NEWi,t-1 * SMALL FIRM     -4.610*** -3.638*** 
     (0.303) (0.280) 
UNC_OLDi,t-1 -0.235 0.034 -0.253 0.129 -0.277 -0.005 
 (0.344) (0.362) (0.345) (0.294) (0.345) (0.362) 
UNC_INDi,t-1 0.537 0.708 0.440 0.602 -0.454 0.282 
 (1.567) (1.181) (1.561) (1.180) (1.621) (1.190) 
PASTINNOi,t-1 0.143 0.282* 0.157 0.288* 0.136 0.275 
 (0.158) (0.170) (0.157) (0.169) (0.159) (0.169) 
PASTPCMi,t-1 2.035** 1.380 2.131** 1.420 1.842* 1.308 
 (0.974) (0.976) (0.975) (0.973) (0.969) (0.963) 
ln(EMPi,t-1) 1.458*** 1.546*** 1.471*** 1.549*** 1.255*** 1.341*** 
 (0.098) (0.101) (0.098) (0.101) (0.107) (0.112) 
PSTOCKi,t-1/EMP i,t-1 9.799*** 9.727*** 9.827*** 9.740*** 9.545*** 9.376*** 
 (2.006) (2.665) (2.013) (2.660) (1.999) (2.685) 
ln(HHIi,t-1) -0.122 0.022 -0.398** -0.197 -0.137 0.003 
 (0.144) (0.137) (0.166) (0.161) (0.142) (0.137) 
ln(RATINGi,t-1) 0.261 -0.159 0.208 -0.191 0.399 -0.051 
 (0.599) (0.522) (0.599) (0.524) (0.592) (0.521) 
EASTi 0.879*** 0.973*** 0.919*** 0.988*** 0.905*** 0.968*** 
 (0.324) (0.317) (0.321) (0.316) (0.323) (0.314) 
Intercept -13.626*** -13.826*** -12.557*** -12.973*** -13.188*** -13.207*** 
 (3.719) (3.159) (3.714) (3.178) (3.667) (3.146) 
17 
Table 2 continued 
Joint significance of industry dummies (χ2(10)) 72.68*** 98.79*** 73.48*** 98.04*** 78.52*** 104.20*** 
Joint significance of time dummies (χ2(6)) 124.57*** 141.39*** 125.11*** 142.98*** 123.19*** 139.89*** 
Joint test on difference of slope coefficients of 
UNC_NEW variables (χ2(1))   7.11*** 7.00*** 10.50*** 17.79*** 
Log-Likelihood -6161.79 -5958.67 -6153.38 -5955.22 -6146.09 -5950.19 
McFadden-R2 0.145 0.173 0.146 0.160 0.147 0.163 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
a) Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level (881 clusters). 
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Figure 1: Estimated effects of new product market uncertainty on R&D investment 
Highly concentrated industries vs. others. Large vs. small firms 
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Note: High concentrated industries are above the upper quintile of the HHI 
distribution. All covariates except new product market uncertainty are taken 
at their median values. Unlike employment as shown in the right panel of 
this figure, HHI is not significant as covariate in the regression. Therefore 
we restricted its independent impact to zero for this illustration. 
Note: Large firms have more than 500 employees. In order to draw this 
curve, we used reference firms that have +/- 100 employees above or below 
the cutoff, i.e. the small firm has 400 employees and the large firm 600. All 
covariates except new product market uncertainty are taken at their median 
values.  
 
